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Abstract: This study reveals the processes through which firms can cope with 
sources of failure in R&D consortia in emerging high-tech markets. We use a 
single case design, focusing on mobile service development to investigate the 
value-creating and value-dissipating activities in a R&D consortium. We 
collected longitudinal data on the collaborative processes in the alliance 
through semi-structured interviews, observations and archival researches for 
over 24 months. The findings suggest that R&D consortia increase the chances 
of success, when diverging interest can be mitigated, cognition can be aligned 
and agreement on time preferences can be reached. We also find that if 
attempts to manage such challenges are ill-timed in the process phases of 
strategic imagination, common ground development, coordinating contributions 
and performance, the success of R&D consortia is called into question, because 
the participants maximise their private benefits at the expense of the common 
ones. We conclude with managerial implications, which suggest a simple, yet 
integrative framework for managing R&D consortia in the context of service 
development, and offer fruitful future research avenues.
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1 Introduction 
In emerging high-tech markets, such as mobile telecommunication services, a single firm 
strategy might be unfeasible due to the lack of technological capabilities, market power 
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and limited willingness to bear service development risks. When NTT-DoCoMo, a 
leading Japanese telecommunication operator introduced its I-mode services, it benefited 
from financial backing and a large market share as an incumbent player in the Japanese 
market. Both factors eased the process to synchronise the alliance partners’ efforts in 
terms of timing, incentives and capabilities to deliver the required service components 
including appropriate handsets, media content and software applications. Today, most of 
the European telecommunication operators are not in such a comfortable position. Many 
mobile operators have relatively low market power. They are burdened with debts from 
acquisitions of UMTS licences1, and they face intense competition due to de-regulation. 
When attempting to develop and introduce mobile services, they cannot simply force the 
suppliers of mobile handsets and media content to deliver according to their strategic 
specification. Thus, R&D consortia are increasingly common in managing innovation in 
emerging markets for mobile telecommunication services. 
Firms participate in such alliances to speed up learning, co-develop services and 
prepare strategic responses to the changing market conditions and technologies (Powell, 
1990). In particular, when pursuing radical innovation (e.g. where new services fit easily 
neither to current processes nor to firm values) firms seek to tap into partner networks to 
mobilise complementary capabilities and co-develop new capabilities (Christensen, 
Verlinden and Westerman, 2002). However, managing R&D consortia require a close 
attention to collective-action problems, such as the alignment of interests, developing 
common understanding and synchronisation of time preferences. Unless those problems 
are addressed in the management of the alliance process, participating in them might 
compromise the learning speed and strategic prospects of partners (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996), and accordingly, lead to dissatisfaction with alliance outcomes 
(Bleek and Ernst, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Park and Ungson, 2001). 
While the literature on strategic alliances is large, only a few studies have focused on 
the understanding of:  
1 The processes by which R&D consortia are build and preserved (Larson, 1992).  
2 The influence of repeated interaction between partners in this process (Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1994).  
3 The conditions fostering and blocking inter-firm learning and cooperation for service 
development (Doz, 1996).  
Although these contributions have advanced our understanding of various aspects of the 
alliance development process, current knowledge about how to manage the alliance 
process remains limited in three important respects, which are as follows:  
1 There is still little empirical evidence on the dynamic aspects of collaboration in 
general and failure sources in particular (Yan and Gray, 1994; Ariño and de la Torre, 
1998). Research on alliances is dominated by deductive theory testing studies, based 
on secondary data, providing few inductive theory generating studies to elucidate 
collaborative dynamics (Bettis, 1991; Parkhe, 1993a). This leaves questions 
concerning when and how to deal with collaborative challenges, which are relatively 
unexplored. 
2 Most of the alliance process researches have been generated in stable and mature 
environments (Oliver, 1990; Reuer and Koza, 2000; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2002). 
Yet, much alliance activity takes place in dynamic high-tech settings (Hagedoorn, 
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1993), where alliances form for various reasons and operate under different 
conditions. 
3 Extant qualitative empirical evidence has been largely confined to two partner 
alliances. However, R&D consortia exhibit particular complications and have 
increased in popularity and importance over the last decade (Doz and Hamel, 1998; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Zeng and Chen, 2003). 
Compared to the dyadic alliances, a partner in the multi-firm situation will feel less guilt 
towards any particular partner, when not cooperating (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Also, 
non-cooperative behaviour is more difficult to detect in R&D consortia and a firm’s 
opportunities to shape the partner’s behaviour through the choice of actions are diluted. 
As a result, firms in R&D consortia have a stronger incentive to defect (Parkhe, 1993b; 
Zeng and Chen, 2003). 
This paper focuses on revealing how value is created and why value may dissipate in 
the process of managing innovation in R&D consortia in the emerging high-tech markets. 
Given the limited number of earlier studies on the dynamics of multi-firm allying, we 
conducted a single case study, focused on the value creating and dissipating processes in 
a six-partner alliance in the Danish mobile internet service market. We observed that the 
alliance had to deal with three crucial management challenges:  
1 aligning cognitions  
2 managing conflict of interest 
3 managing timing of contributions. 
The alliance also went through discernable phases, which we label as strategic visioning, 
common-ground development, coordinating-contribution and performing. In each of 
these phases, we identify key problems, and show when and how they need to be 
addressed.   
The paper proceeds as follows: 
1 We introduce our methodological approach and data sources. 
2 We present our results focusing on the managerial challenges, which the participants 
in a R&D consortium have to deal with. 
3 We link the challenges to the process phases and suggest when in the overall process 
the challenges are best addressed. 
4 We develop managerial implications and based on the limitations of our study, we 
conclude with the beneficial paths for future research. 
2 Methodology and data 
We use a single case study as the research design. We followed a six-partner R&D 
consortium for 2 years (2003–2005) to develop insights on value creation and value 
dissipation processes of R&D consortia. The purpose of the alliance was to develop, 
analyse and offer practical guidelines on the design and implementation of location-, 
situation- and time-sensitive mobile services. Following a new service development 
alliance in the market for mobile services allowed us to focus on the inter-firm 
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collaboration in an emerging high-tech market, where service development is primal for 
firm performance (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). The mobile internet service market 
emerged in the late 1990s as technological developments in carrier technologies, which 
made the provision of advanced mobile data services possible. Carrier technologies have 
evolved through their first, second and third generations in many countries across the 
globe. While the first and second generations were mainly used for voice and simple data 
services, the 2.5G technology enabled provision of data-intensive services, and 3G 
increased the bandwidth and speed in service provisioning. These technological 
developments have generated significant inter-firm dependence as firms from hitherto 
separate industries, such as network operators, handset manufactures, content providers 
and infrastructure providers must be involved in service provisioning. As the competitive 
situation in mobile telecommunication is new and unique, we took an explorative 
approach (Yin, 1989) concentrating on the theory development in favour of theory testing 
(see Parkhe, 1993a). We applied the traditional Grounded Theory method, in which the 
researcher addresses the subject theoretically empty-handed (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
Data was collected from several sources. First, we conducted a field study, using 12 
semi-structured interviews for over 12 months with six managers from different partners 
in the consortium. These managers were the key responsible persons in the involved 
organisations and the ones that participated in the consortium meetings. The partners 
included each one in handset manufacture, infrastructure provider, network operation and 
three content providers varying in size and international scope (see Table 1). The 
managers interviewed, represented different divisions of their firms: the manager from 
the handset manufacturing firm represented a new venturing division, the manager from 
the network operator represented its external relations division, the manager from the 
infrastructure provider represented an international business development division and 
the managers from the content providing organisations represented an IT department, an 
IT and mobile initiatives project group and a content specific project group focused on 
new media platforms, respectively. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted for 
60–90 minutes. The focus of the interviews was the person’s own factual experience with 
the alliance, the rationale for their firm’s participation, the evolution of their involvement 
and commitment and their perception of the interaction with the other partners.  
Second, we attended company presentations of 120 minutes by each partner, set up at 
the initiation of the alliance to provide the partners a better understanding of the involved 
organisations. 
Third, we participated in the monthly meetings with all the partners, lasting for  
120–180 minutes. The general purpose of the meetings was to discuss relevant partner 
activities, the status of the alliance activities, in which direction the partners wished to 
proceed and how. Both the interviews and the monthly meetings were recorded on video 
and transcribed subsequently. In addition, we participated in informal socialising events 
organised by the alliance members.  
Finally, we were added to the alliance mailing list and obtained access to all project 
documents. This triangulation of various data sources strengthens the robustness of our 
findings. Table 2 provides an overview of the primary data sources. 
Three researchers participated in collecting and coding data, hence minimising 
subjective biases. As is typical in inductive research, we analysed the data by first 
synthesising the interviews, the alliance meeting transcripts and archival data, and 
constructing the individual case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). To further validate the 
interpretation, this was presented to the alliance partners allowing us to confirm our 
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results and discuss causal links between different collaborative processes and the 
widening or narrowing of the gap between the potential and realised value. In contrast to 
most of the other studies (e.g. Bleek and Ernst, 1991; Geringer and Herbert, 1991), we 
not only asked the alliance managers about their perception of the alliance development 
processes and the associated challenges after the alliance, but also investigated the issues 
while the processes were taking place. The combination of real time longitudinal data and 
multiple retrospective data sources allowed a stronger analysis and increased the internal 
and external validity (Leonard-Barton, 1990). 
Table 1 Descriptions of the alliance partners 
 Alfa Beta Gamma Delta Epsilon Zeta 
Line of 
business 
Mobile 
terminals, 
telecom 
networks, 
IT 
infrastructure, 
hardware 
Telecom 
network 
operator 
Radio, TV, 
internet 
content 
Newspaper  
content 
Consumer 
information 
Number of 
employees 
51.000 141.000 18.000 3.500 100 100 
International 
diversity 
Worldwide Worldwide Europe Denmark Denmark Denmark 
Impact of the 
Mobile 
Internet 
Services 
(MIS)
Facilitating 
use of MIS 
requires  
new 
capabilities 
Supporting  
and  
developing 
MIS requires 
new 
capabilities 
Providing 
MIS
constitutes 
a new sub-
segment 
Offering 
MIS
constitutes 
a new 
market 
Offering 
MIS
constitutes 
a new 
market 
Offering 
MIS
constitutes a 
new market 
Competitive 
position 
Market 
leader 
globally 
Market leader 
globally 
Market 
leader 
locally 
Market 
leader 
locally 
Market 
leader 
locally 
Market 
leader 
locally 
Division of 
involved 
manager in 
alliance and 
interviews 
New 
ventures 
division 
International 
business 
development 
division 
External 
relations 
division 
New media 
platforms 
group 
IT and 
mobile 
initiatives 
group 
IT 
department 
Number of 
interviews 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
Table 2 Primary data sources 
Data type Number Total time Dates 
Interviews 12 720–1080 minutes April 2003–April 2004 
Partner company presentations 6 720 minutes February 2003–April 2003 
Project meetings 20 3000 minutes February 2003–February 2005 
Presentations by potential 
partners 
4 360–480 minutes July 2003–November 2004 
      
      
    Failure sources in R&D consortia: the case of mobile service development 165    
      
      
      
3 Managerial challenges in R&D consortia 
Throughout the service development process we observed that the alliance had to deal 
with three crucial management challenges:  
1 managing conflict of interest  
2 alignment of cognition 
3 managing timing of contributions. 
3.1 Managing conflict of interest 
The explicit goal of the R&D consortium we studied was broadly defined as “to develop, 
analyse and offer practical guidelines on the design and implementation of location-, 
situation- and time-sensitive services”. Although this goal was generally supported by all 
the partners, each partner also had individual interests in joining the alliance. These 
varied from explorative interests, such as ‘an opportunity to learn about content delivery 
and the market in general’, ‘develop our business through exploring opportunities’ and 
‘trial for testing new product features’ to more exploitative motivations ‘identify a 
business model for commercialisation’, ‘serve our existing customers’ and ‘improve 
communication in the value chain’. While no partner had interests in conflict with the 
collective aim, there were collaborative challenges that made collective-action difficult. 
Some managers were concerned that they would carry the costs of interface specification 
and standardisation and that their competitors hereafter would simply be able to introduce 
their services at lower costs. Other partners did not share these concerns.  
These differences in interests also reflected that the alliance activities represented 
different stages in the partners’ core-industry life-cycles. The technology partners had 
been generally offering mobile voice services and basic data services for several years 
and although technological developments allowed for introducing novel services, they 
did not create a new market completely. For the content providers, the changes were 
more severe as mobile business constituted a separate technological sub-field and a new 
business area. As a consequence, the technology partners were most familiar with the 
mobile telecommunication market and had relatively specific interests. They shared a 
similar business understanding and vocabulary and could discuss the use of various 
technologies, the setup of interfaces and the technical specifications. In contrast, the 
content providers had limited experience with the activities of the alliance and expressed 
much broader interests. They had difficulties in internalising knowledge from the alliance 
activities, as they did not understand the technical specifications of the new technologies 
and their potential implications for their value propositions. Hence, despite the agreement 
on a common goal, the content partners were initially primarily interested in learning 
before doing, whereas the technology partners were interested in learning by doing.  
3.2 Alignment of cognition 
The partners expressed frustration with the low level of knowledge sharing in the 
alliance. The manager from Alfa explained: “When people participate in group 
discussions, they are sometimes outside their knowledge area and the discussion gets 
very confusing”. The alliance was split into sub-groups to enable better communication. 
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All partners agreed that splitting up the alliance was helpful in bringing the project 
forward and expressed enthusiasm about the increased knowledge sharing in the sub-
groups. Yet, firms grouping together were the firms that shared the same level of 
specification of objectives and operated in relatively related businesses, which created a 
false assurance of mutual understanding. Although the knowledge generated in the sub-
groups was presented at the project meeting, differences in firms’ relative absorptive 
capacity in the specific domain resulted in collaborative problems. It was implicitly 
assumed that a group could individually produce outputs and subsequently transfer these 
to the other group. Yet, both the complications of producing new knowledge and the 
ability to transfer knowledge across the groups were underestimated. The manager from 
Delta stated:  
“When you represent a content providing company you perceive content as 
very complex to work with, whereas working with technology appears rather 
easy. We show a lack of respect and understanding for the complexity of each 
partner’s domain”.  
Similarly, the manager of Zeta mentioned that it appeared very abstract just to prepare 
and define services on a piece of paper and that he and his co-workers would benefit 
greatly if the technical partners helped them through the process. Yet, the technology 
firms had little appreciation for these perspectives. The manager from Alfa commented:  
“It is not the technical details that should be of interest to the content providers. 
Maybe they would like to know these, but the important thing is to design the 
services and them being aware of what it takes for them to deliver these 
services”.   
Likewise, the manager in Beta explained that he was hesitant to push the technology to 
the content providers, as it would interfere with what they should actually focus on.  
On one hand, the technology firms felt that they had provided sufficient input to the 
content group among other things through presentations of the system architecture at 
project meetings, but that they did not get anything in return.  
The content group, on the other hand, often felt like outsiders at project meetings, 
because they did not comprehend the technical terms and the implications for the 
development of their firm specific mobile services. The manager from Zeta noted:  
“I’m not updated on what the other partners are doing and it is difficult to see 
how the individual partners actually push this project forward and how they are 
sharing experiences from their own company with partners”.  
These issues led to frustration for all partners with implications for their individual input-
output relations in knowledge sharing processes. While content providers felt sidelined in 
the discussions and withheld contributions, technology providers blamed them for their 
passive stance.
3.3 Managing timing of contributions 
Even though market entry decisions for the new services were not of immediate concern 
for the alliance, the different timing preferences of the partners quickly surfaced. The 
partners differed substantially in their perceptions of the temporal dimensions both across 
and within the content and technology groups. Some firms wanted to follow late-mover 
strategies, as the statement from the manager in Delta illustrates:  
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“Rich media services are very complex to deliver and you have to be sure about 
what will work and not. We do not have to be first-movers. We know how 
difficult it is to introduce new services and it is not very important to be first”.  
The manager further explained that Delta had not been first moving in the internet arena 
either but was able to catch up easily. Other partners wanted to be able to move fast. The 
manager from Epsilon stated:  
“We do not aim at being the leading company in this field, but we don’t want 
competitors to move beyond us. So if a competitor launches a service we want 
to be able to move fast. We have tried to be the first to market but that did not 
pay off ”.  
Finally, others found it important to be in the forefront of their market. The manager of 
Zeta explained: “We are progressive in terms of delivering content to new media and we 
will be the first mover, when it comes to delivering consumer information through mobile 
services”.  
4 Managerial challenges across process phases 
The alliance went through discernable phases, which we have retrospectively labelled as 
strategic visioning, common-ground development, coordinating contribution and 
performing. In each of these phases, key problems and challenges as described above 
occurred (see Table 3).  
4.1 Strategic visioning 
Strategic visioning took place in the first phase of the alliance process. Alliance partners 
were engaged in generating new ideas, creating awareness of possible futures and 
developing new intentions towards markets opportunities. Collective imagination was 
facilitated by brainstorming sessions, emphasising the role of energising diverse voices 
from the different partners with different knowledge and skills, to take part in idea 
generation for future value creation.  
The differential interests described above, however, were not explicitly expressed ex
ante and a common understanding of what each partner wanted to derive from the 
collaboration did not develop. The results were lengthy meetings, where partners often 
left uncertain about what they could expect from the others and what was expected from 
them before the next meeting. The general opinion was that there was “too much 
discussion around but not about where the collaboration was going and what needed to be 
done” as expressed by the manager from Epsilon. The different prioritisation of the 
partners created confusion about what would be the focus of the project and whether 
partners were actually working on the project to the extent that their official commitment 
signified. Manager from Delta stated: 
“I am unsure about what for instance Beta and Gamma are doing. We need to 
know whether we are moving in the same direction or not …I don’t know if the 
other partners have changed their goals or if they are still interested in the same 
thing”.  
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Table 3 Alliance development phases and the value creating and dissipating processes 
Phase 1 
Strategic  
visioning 
Phase 2 
Creating common 
ground 
Phase 3 
Coordinating 
contribution 
Phase 4 
Performing 
Value  
dissipating 
factors 
Early interest 
specification and 
hidden conflict 
Large knowledge 
gaps between 
partners 
Heterogeneity in 
timing of entry 
preferences 
Failure of a firm in 
delivering upon 
expectation 
Antecedents  
for value 
dissipating 
factors 
Different value 
appropriation 
opportunities; 
Different degree 
of initial market 
knowledge 
Different 
knowledge bases 
of partners from 
unrelated 
industries 
Different first-
mover (dis)-
advantages; 
Different time 
spans; Different  
risk preferences 
cannot be abridged 
Interdependence 
among  R&D 
outputs combined 
with reliance on 
single partners for 
central R&D  
Resulting value 
dissipating 
processes 
Communication 
problems and 
associated 
confusion; 
Commitment 
concerns due to 
distrust 
Knowledge 
transfer and 
utilisation 
problems; Impact 
on initial input-
output plans 
Divergence in 
temporal resource 
commitments and 
associated 
frustration 
Coordination 
problems and 
associated 
inefficient resource 
use and 
investments; exit of 
key player 
Impact Project delays 
because of lacking 
shared vision; 
conflicting interest 
dominated the 
discussions 
Ineffective 
communication 
because of too 
large knowledge 
gaps; mis-
understanding 
leads to conflict 
Disagreements on 
sub-project 
milestones lead  
to delays; lacking 
clear  
responsibilities  
for sub-project 
integration leads to 
slow down of 
project progress 
Players seek private 
benefits in dual 
setting and threaten 
the overall project 
success 
Whereas partners obviously had different interests, none of them found that troubling 
prima facie. The manager from Gamma commented:  
“I think it is good that we have different motivations and bring different 
perspectives into the project. It just means that we have to spend more time 
addressing these and structuring the project”.  
Hence, the problem was not that interest conflicts led partners not to comply with the 
agreement or behave opportunistically. Rather, the lack of conflict prevented efficient 
collaboration towards reaching the specified goal. When the partners were not aware of 
each other’s motivational differences, the associated problems were not confronted and 
eliminated, but continued to exist and sometimes grew in hidden form. As a result, 
imaginations about possible futures remained in the abstract and the direction for the 
consortium’s strategic agenda and commitment for concrete contributions remained 
elusive.  
4.2 Common ground development 
Creating common ground was the aim of the second phase of the alliance process. This 
phase was signified by investments to share language and experience and to agree on an 
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agenda including a project portfolio of sub-projects. On a high level, the alliance was 
divided into a technology group and a content group with three firms in each to increase 
focus and facilitate the cognitive alignment. The alliance partners, however, lacked the 
common knowledge of each others’ ability to contribute to various tasks, because the 
knowledge required to move towards the collaborative goal was dispersed and difficult to 
explicate. Manager from Alfa commented:
“I think we still need to develop a better understanding of what skills each 
partner actually brings into the project. There may be skill gaps and we may 
have to bring in other partners but we need to learn about each other to identify 
such needs”.  
The problem was not that the partners were unwilling or generally unable to transfer 
knowledge across firm boundaries, as knowledge was successfully transferred across firm 
boundaries in both the content and the technology group. Manager in Delta stated:  
“In the content group we have been sharing our experiences in a free and 
friendly mode. That is more difficult with all the partners. I don’t know what is 
going on in the technology group and what they are putting into the project 
now?”.  
On behalf of the technology group, the manager in Gamma similarly explained: “We 
have very open and intense meetings in the technology group and we all feel that now we 
can really do something”. Even though the two sub-groups were progressing, most of the 
managers remained uncertain about what resources and capabilities, each alliance partner 
actually had and intended to bring into the service development efforts. However, the 
partners had been relatively clear on what tasks they regarded, as outside their scope of 
involvement, which led to a common understanding of two issues that needed to be 
addressed.  
1 It was necessary to bridge the communication problems between the content and the 
technology firms. 
2 Responsibility had to be allocated for necessary tasks, for which none of the partners 
planned to assume responsibility.  
The interest differences combined with a lack of common understanding caused 
ineffective communication and collaboration. A manager from Delta stated:
“I am unsure about what for instance firm Beta and Gamma are doing. We need 
to know whether we are moving in the same direction or not …. I don’t know if 
the other partners have changed their goals or if they are still interested in the 
same thing”.  
This led the partners to arrange an extraordinary meeting to address the issue. As a result 
of this meeting, a project document was developed that should create common 
knowledge of the challenges for all sectors involved in mobile business and hereby 
improve the inter-partner understanding in the alliance. Also, in order to explicate short-
term and long-term alliance objectives, the technology and content groups made explicit 
in a project definition, what they expected from the alliance, based on the level of 
resource commitments. These measures were successful in establishing a common 
understanding of the interest differences. While most managers considered the presence 
of various goals beneficial, they had joined the alliance with little understanding of the 
complications of entering a business development alliance with multiple partners. 
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Manager from Beta commented: “In hindsight we should have expected the difficulties. 
In other more typical projects we are only working with one partner and we have a 
predefined narrow aim. This is very different”. 
4.3 Coordinating contributions 
To translate ideas into realities, the alliance engaged in action planning through defining 
concrete projects. The aim was to develop specific sub-project plans, timelines and 
responsibility. These plans were intended to cover aspects of required knowledge 
development, investment plans. Two of the most serious problems in building a coherent 
project portfolio were disagreement on the required timing of sub-project milestones and 
unclear responsibilities for integration tasks across project results.  
The partly hidden variations in the strategic aspirations and timing preference turned 
out to be a severe process barrier. The partners’ time preferences ranging from being 
first-movers and fast-follower to being a late entrant, had implications for the 
collaborative work processes. Quality and novelty of services was important to all 
partners, but some emphasised quality and reliability over novelty and innovative 
reputation. Others expressed concern that the market would surpass the otherwise timely 
alliance initiative, if they did not move ahead more quickly. The different temporal 
preferences resulted in some partners contributing more actively than others. This was 
reflected in the regularity of the project meeting participation, the propensity to send 
replacements if the key manager could not participate, the timely completion of agreed 
tasks, etc. In addition, the partners that did not perceive the need to be the first to market 
as vital often took most time for decision-making. Whether this was due to their entry 
timing preferences or other elements, such as a bureaucratic decision-making in parent 
organisation or lack of capabilities was difficult to assess but caused other partners to be 
dissatisfied with the work progress. Finally, the firms expressed different perceptions of 
what was needed to move forward. The managers from Epsilon and Zeta mentioned that 
sometimes the content partners felt ready to take the next step but then some technical 
system was missing. Similar, problems were advanced from technology managers, who 
often stated that all they needed to proceed was some content services. For the partners 
emphasising speed, this indicated that some were waiting for others to move because they 
could afford to do so rather than driving the progress themselves. All these difficulties of 
moving ahead caused frustration for the firms that saw novelty and speed to market as 
important. This created a negative feedback loop as the lack of progress was de-
motivating for all partners. The manager from Epsilon noted: “Spending a lot of time on 
the project is a waste of time when you don’t know where you are going and when”. 
4.4 Performing 
To address the critical issues, the manager from Epsilon suggested bringing in a content 
aggregator as an additional partner. The rationale was that, such a firm would have 
experience working with both technology and content firms and therefore could reduce 
communication problems. Moreover, none of the partners had planned to take on the task 
of aggregating content from the content partners and preparing it in the appropriate 
technical formats. Hereafter a content aggregator was approached. Although the 
aggregator was not immediately offered inclusion in the alliance, primarily due to 
complexities around input and output requirements, an agreement was reached that a 
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close collaboration should be initiated. The aggregator’s subsequent participation in the 
development efforts, allowed the discussions at the project meetings to be more concrete. 
For instance, the requirements put up by the content aggregator for interface specification 
and service functionalities enabled the partners to engage in very specific discussions 
about their contributions. The different preferences for the time pace caused much 
discussion and frustration. However, little concrete action was taken to reduce the 
problem. None of the partners could force the other partners to perform specific tasks at 
certain times. Interestingly, many partners suggested that the problem could be reduced 
through more hierarchical governance and leadership, but they all agreed that the costs of 
such a change would exceed the benefits. Manager from Beta argued:  
“This project is interesting because it is open and flat. Each partner can 
influence the agenda and that is an interesting and challenging way of working. 
It is up to the individual partners to put forth their agendas and we do not want 
to loose this element”.  
Other managers argued that introducing a more hierarchical structure could reduce the 
alliance’s ability to benefit from the diversity of the partners. 
Despite the differences in temporal preferences, the firms began to coordinate their 
development efforts. The content group began to meet more often, working on specifying 
what kind of services they intended to offer, which context-dependent variables they 
would emphasise and what kind of functionalities they would require. Likewise, the 
technology group increased the frequency of their meetings, where they addressed 
technological needs and potential complications related to the system architecture. While 
some work activities were conducted in collaboration, other inputs were to be delivered 
by individual partners. Some partners were simply expected to deliver existing 
technologies or assets and integrate these with technologies and assets of other partners, 
whereas others had significant development efforts ahead, in order to deliver their part. 
Most importantly the development efforts of some partners depended on the prior 
development efforts of other partners. Most important in this respect was the 
development of a standardised mobile platform for distribution of context dependent 
services and information on mobile terminals.  
Alfa had assumed the sole responsibility of developing the platform, which was 
scheduled to be completed in six month, after the work process began. Yet, Alfa 
announced a three-month delay, but mentioned that new features would be added when 
the platform was ready. However, the development was delayed again by 3 months. The 
missing platform, delayed the development of other elements due to the projected web of 
inter-relations between the platform, potential future services and the technical 
infrastructure. The content partners were not able to develop services, because they had 
little understanding of the platform’s characteristics as many elements remained 
undefined and they had very limited knowledge about mobile platform features in 
general. Beyond the difficulties of developing their services, the content partners also 
reduced their enthusiasm about the collaboration. Manager in Delta noted:  
“We lack some motivation due to the fact that we have been missing the 
technology a-ha experiences showing what we actually can do. We have been 
waiting a long time for the platform”.  
      
      
   172 V. Mahnke and M.L. Overby    
      
      
      
Alfa acknowledged that much depended on the development of the platform, but 
continued to underscore the strength of the platform when it would be ready and tried to 
introduce other issues that the alliance could work on until then. The manager 
commented:  
“I expect that the availability of the platform will spur a lot more activities. 
However, this means that we have to be specific about the analyses we will like 
to run”.  
Yet, partners began to be more reluctant to put in efforts before the platform could be 
seen and tested. Manager from Epsilon stated:  
“It is disappointing that we have not seen this platform yet. The launch of it has 
been announced again and again and again… And the whole project is based on 
this. There has not been an overall willingness to explicitly accept this in the 
project. I’m disappointed about what we concretely have accomplished”.  
After a number of announced delays Alfa at one point declared that it would suspend its 
development of the platform for financial reasons. 
The announced delays of the platform were initially accepted by all partners as ‘part 
of the game’. However, as the delays continued, partners began asking continuously 
about when it would be ready and complaining that the project could not move forward 
before. Still, the responsibility and development efforts remained exclusively with Alfa. 
The manager of Beta mentioned that when Beta cooperated with another firm, it was 
typically clear what each partner should produce in a specific time period and they would 
ensure that this was produced or they would be compensated accordingly. However, in 
this particular alliance “the opportunity and incentive to punish and reward is somehow 
diluted” as he expressed. When Alfa suspended the development efforts, it caused 
immediate disappointment but also a subsequent relief, as it allowed the partners to 
search for other opportunities. Some partners had already started looking for alternatives 
and found that the content aggregator, which the alliance collaborated with, had a mobile 
platform with different functionalities but it was running. The partners, including Alfa, 
quickly decided to proceed with the available platform. The content aggregator’s 
platform was easy to install on the handset manufacture’s terminals and it was likewise 
relatively uncomplicated to put the technical set-up in place. Hereafter, basic services 
could be offered on a test basis. This enabled the partners to engage in co-development 
that improved certain functionalities of the platform and allowed for more advanced 
services.  
From the beginning, the platform was introduced as a unique and central element of 
the service development efforts and became deterministic by defining how the alliance 
should succeed and the sequence of carrying out tasks in the alliance. Yet, this 
deterministic reliance on a particular development effort slowed down the progress of the 
alliance. In addition, the strict confidence in a single partner’s willingness and ability to 
produce a central element in the service development process proved to be costly for the 
alliance. It disabled the partners to coordinate the efforts, as it blocked further progress 
practically and cognitively. It also affected the confidence in the commitment of Alfa and 
the expectations and attitudes of the partners towards the alliance as a whole. Some 
partners lost interest in the alliance, whereas others frustrated with the development, 
began looking for alternative options. Nonetheless, several participants benefited from 
participating in the R&D consortium. Gamma developed mobile music business model, 
which was launched at the end of the consortia, Delta made an individual deal with 
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Gamma on music rights and co-developed download options for MP3 formats, and 
Epsilon benefited merely from the reputation effects of participating in the high-profile 
alliance. 
5 Discussion: coping with managerial challenges  
In this section we discuss how our findings regarding the R&D consortium process 
contribute to the literature. We offer contributions on three main accounts, which are as 
follows:  
First, we contribute to the alliance process literature (Doz, 1996; Larson, 1992; Ring 
and van de Ven, 1994) by identifying three main challenges in multiple partner inter-firm 
collaboration (aligning cognition, mediating conflict of interest and managing timing 
preferences) and by showing when in the development process each challenge is most 
important to manage (see Table 4). While the challenges identified above have rich 
linkages to the literature, they have not earlier been integrated to enable assessment of 
their relative importance over time, as suggested above, in our process framework. 
Scholars have argued that alignment of cognition is important (Reuer, Zollo and Singh, 
2002), particularly in alliances involving firms from unrelated industries as such 
arrangements often imply cognitive diversity (Perlmutter and Heenan, 1986). While firms 
from different industries typically ally to share knowledge (Sakakibara, 1997) 
transferring knowledge between firms with different knowledge endowments may be 
costly (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kumar and Nti, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). At 
the same time, studies have shown that positive returns to alliance announcements 
correlate with dissimilarity of businesses (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Reuer and Koza, 
2000). Our findings contribute by suggesting that aligning cognition in the strategic 
imagination phase is of crucial importance to avoid later delays in the alliance process 
and to gain promises of credible resource commitment to the joint R&D activities, earlier 
in the process. Since attempts at aligning conflict of interest surfaced too early in the 
mobile service development alliance, an effective strategic imagination process was 
prevented. As a result, common visions on value creation remained unclear, and 
participants withheld resource commitment. While distributed capabilities are important 
for value creation through innovation in R&D consortia, unless cognition is continuously 
aligned, misunderstandings and haggling will result. A fruitful avenue of future research 
is therefore to address the question how different capabilities of alliance members can be 
better combined without compromising specialisation gains. The greater the cognitive 
differences between participants in a R&D consortium, the harder knowledge 
combination will become. On the other hand, cognitive differences also contribute to 
develop new combination possibilities in the development of innovation.   
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Table 4 Coping with managerial challenges at the right time 
Phase 1 
Strategic  
visioning 
Phase 2  
Creating common 
ground 
Phase 3 
Coordinating 
contribution 
Phase 4 
Performing 
Antecedents for 
value creation 
Utilise different 
motivations to 
explore value 
creation 
opportunities 
Utilise capability 
complementarities 
to enable 
synergies 
Make timing 
preferences explicit 
to facilitate 
cohesion and 
setting priorities 
Sufficient 
motivation and 
capabilities to 
commercialise 
successful R&D  
Master 
challenges 
Align cognition 
Align interest 
Align timing 
Align cognition 
Align interest 
Align timing 
Align cognition 
Align interest 
Align timing 
Align cognition 
Align interest 
Align timing 
Success  
factors 
Enable strategic 
visioning by 
sharing ideas on 
future value 
added, bracket 
conflicting 
interests; ensure 
commitment 
based on shared 
vision 
Address 
conflicting 
interests openly 
and directly; 
separate 
individual firm 
interests from 
consortia interests 
by forming sub-
groups 
Initiate selection 
process on sub-
projects to be 
scaled up; different 
time preferences 
will show up in the 
selection process; 
work explicitly on 
timing preferences 
Decide on trade off 
between common 
and private benefits  
Second, earlier literature has furthermore recognised the importance of managing 
conflicting interests (Hamel, 1991; Khanna, 1998; Khanna, Gulati and Nohria, 1998). 
Focus has been on interest conflicts due to tension between cooperation and competition, 
flexibility and rigidity and short-term versus long-term orientation (Das and Teng, 2000; 
Zeng and Chen, 2003). Interest conflicts may arise, when firms have individual goals that 
diverge from the collective goal of the alliance and firms find it advantageous to 
maximise individual gains at the expense of the alliance (Parkhe, 1993b; Ariño and Doz, 
2000; Koza and Lewin, 2000; Park and Ungson, 2001). Since firms enter R&D 
consortium with different interests, it is of crucial importance to address them 
appropriately. What is less obvious in extant literature is when conflicting interest should 
be addressed in the overall process. Confronting the conflicting interests too early will 
impede strategic imagination, confronting them too late will create an atmosphere of 
distrust, leading firms to engage in power plays, which impedes progress, creates a 
climate of distrust and prevents much needed knowledge sharing, when coordinating 
activities across sub-projects. By implication, we submit that conflicting interests are best 
addressed early in the stage of creating common ground. Future research might 
beneficially focus on the forms of conflict mediation in different phases of the alliance 
process. Questions, such as how do formal agreements on eventually resulting intellectual 
property rights influence behaviour of participants in the service development process; 
and, how do informal mechanisms such as trust building exercises in the project teams 
influence the participants perception of conflicting interest, constitute interesting research 
agendas. 
Third, the importance of managing the timing of contributions is also well-recognised. 
Some firms may have short-term and other long-term orientations (Das and Teng, 2000) 
or they may have general differences in their risk preference positions (Chiles and 
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McMackin, 1996). However, the dominant explanation for why managing timing of 
contributions is important is that preferences for timing of market entry decision differ. 
Some firms may seek to enjoy first-mover advantages, such as pre-empting the market 
for critical resources, partners or positions; acquiring a market leader reputation; shaping 
buyer preferences; creating customer switching costs; realising learning curve effects; or 
establishing technical standards (Carpenter and Nakamoto, 1989; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998; Makadok, 1998; Porter, 1983; 
Schmalensee, 1982). Other firms may afford a ‘wait-and-see’ approach that enables them 
to free-ride on first-movers investments in market development, appropriate learning, and 
postpone investments until technological and market uncertainties are resolved 
(Dasgupta, 1988; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Golder and Tellis, 1993; Mitchell, 1991; 
Shamsie, Phelps and Kuperman, 2004). As first-mover (dis)advantages do not materialise 
identically across firms and industries (Robinson, 1988; Robinson and Fornell, 1985; 
Schoenecker and Cooper, 1998; Song, Di Benedetto and Zhao, 1999) cross industry 
alliances typically involve timing tensions. This fact has been subject to little scholarly 
attention. We suggest that while it may be naive to assume that timing preferences will be 
openly revealed, they may surface in the coordinating contributions phase, when project 
participants integrate sub-project’s milestones with the overall project’s time schedules. 
Behaviour of participants, for example, when delaying sub-projects can be observed and 
linked to the causes of timing preferences. In this phase it will be crucial for managers of 
R&D consortia to identify causes and to isolate slow sub-projects from the overall pace 
of progress. A fruitful path for future research is to focus on the causes of timing 
behaviour in R&D consortia. Finally, while rich linkages to earlier literature exist on the 
nature of the specific challenges in R&D consortia, our framework integrates them and 
suggests when they may best be managed.    
6 Conclusion 
This study focused on the management of multi-firm collaboration in an emerging high-
tech market. Extant process studies have focused on dyadic alliances. Yet, R&D 
consortia have increased in popularity and importance over the last decade (Doz and 
Hamel, 1998; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Zeng and Chen, 2003) and several scholars have 
argued that research on R&D consortia has been sporadic and that increased focus on 
these is warranted (Das and Teng, 2002; Gomes-Casseres, 2003; Jones et al., 1998; 
Spekman et al., 1998). Multi-firm collaboration in the context of service development 
exhibit high output, cognitive and behavioural uncertainty and greater difficulties of 
specifying common goals (Evan and Olk, 1990; Ring, Doz and Olk, 2005). This results in 
added coordination challenges including aligning interest, cognition and timing 
preferences. Thus, the extent of the challenges and the importance of approaching them at 
the right time are more pronounced in R&D consortia. We present a framework that 
suggests when it is important to master particular challenges in order to cope with the 
failure sources of multi-firm cooperation. Beyond the theoretical implications the 
framework also holds important implications for management. R&D consortia increase 
the chances of success when cognition can be aligned, diverging interest can be 
mitigated; and agreement on time preferences can be reached. We also find that if 
attempts to manage such challenges are ill-timed in the process phases of strategic 
imagination, common ground development, coordinating contributions and performance, 
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the success of R&D consortia is jeopardised. Thus managers of R&D consortia need not 
only to identify specific challenges as outlined above, but they also need to address them 
at the right time. To enable right timing of addressing management challenges, we 
integrate case findings with earlier literature in a simple, yet comprehensive process 
framework. Utilising this framework should assist managers in reducing the gap between 
potential and realised value creation in multi-firm service development alliances.  
References 
Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H. (1972) ‘Production, information costs and economic organization’, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 62, pp.777–795. 
Ariño, A. and de la Torre, J. (1998) ‘Learning from failure: towards an evolutionary model of 
collaborative ventures’, Organization Science, Vol. 9, pp.306–325. 
Ariño, A. and Doz, Y. (2000) ‘Rescuing troubled alliances ... before it’s too late’, European 
Management Journal, Vol. 18, pp.173–182. 
Balakrishnan, S. and Koza, M. (1993) ‘Information asymmetry, adverse selection, and joint 
ventures: theory and evidence’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 20, 
pp.99–117. 
Bettis, R.A. (1991) ‘Strategic management and the straightjacket: an editorial essay’, Organization 
Science, Vol. 2, pp.315–319. 
Bleek, J. and Ernst, D. (1991) ‘The way to win in cross-border alliances’, Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 69, pp.127–135. 
Brown, S. and Eisenhardt, K. (1995) ‘Product development: past research, present findings, and 
future directions’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, pp.343–378. 
Carpenter, G.S. and Nakamoto, K. (1989) ‘Consumer preference formation and pioneering 
advantage’, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 26, pp.285–298. 
Chiles, T.H. and McMackin, J.F. (1996) ‘Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and transaction 
cost economics’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, pp.73–99. 
Christensen, C.M., Verlinden, M. and Westerman, G. (2002) ‘Disruption, disintegration and the 
dissipation of differentiability’, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 11, pp.955–993. 
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. (1990) ‘Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and 
innovation’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, pp.128–152. 
Das, T.K. and Teng, B.S. (2000) ‘Instabilities of strategic alliances: an internal tensions 
perspective’, Organization Science, Vol. 11, pp.77–101. 
Das, T.K. and Teng, B.S. (2002) ‘Alliance constellations: a social exchange perspective’, Academy 
of Management Review, Vol. 27, pp.445–456. 
Dasgupta, P. (1988) ‘Patents, priority and imitation or, the economics of races and waiting games’, 
The Economic Journal, Vol. 98, pp.66–80. 
Doz, Y. (1996) ‘The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: initial conditions or learning 
processes?’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17, pp.55–83. 
Doz, Y.L. and Hamel, G. (1998) Alliance Advantage. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School. 
Eisenhardt, K. (1989) ‘Building theory from case study research’, Academy of Management 
Review, Vol. 14, pp.532–550. 
Eisenhardt, K. and Schoonhoven, C. (1996) ‘Resource-based view of strategic alliance formation: 
strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms’, Organization Science, Vol. 7,  
pp.136–150. 
Evan, W. and Olk, P. (1990) ‘R&D consortia: a new U.S. organizational form’, Sloan Management 
Review, Vol. 31, pp.37–46. 
Freeman, C. and Soete, L. (1997) The Economics of Industrial Innovation. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
      
      
    Failure sources in R&D consortia: the case of mobile service development 177    
      
      
      
Geringer, M.J. and Herbert, L. (1991) ‘Measuring performance of international joint ventures’, 
Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 22, pp.249–264. 
Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory – Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Golder, P.N. and Tellis, G.J. (1993) ‘Pioneer advantage: marketing logic or marketing legend?’, 
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 30, pp.158–170. 
Gomes-Casseres, B. (1994) ‘Group versus group: how alliance networks compete’, Harvard 
Business Review, Vol. 43, pp.62–70. 
Gomes-Casseres, B. (2003) ‘Competitive advantage in alliance constellations’, Strategic 
Organization, Vol. 1, pp.327–335. 
Hagedoorn, J. (1993) ‘Understanding the rationale of strategic technology partnering: 
interorganizational modes of cooperation and sectorial differences’, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 14, pp.371–385. 
Hamel, G. (1991) ‘Competition for competence and inter-partner learning within international 
strategic alliances’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 12, (Special Issue: Global Strategy) 
pp.83–103. 
Jones, C., Hesterly, W.S., Fladmoe-Lindquist, K. and Borgatti, S.P. (1998) ‘Professional service 
constellations: how strategies and capabilities influence collaborative stability and change’, 
Organization Science, Vol. 9, pp.396–410. 
Khanna, T. (1998) ‘The scope of alliances’, Organization Science, Vol. 9, pp.340–355. 
Khanna, T., Gulati, R. and Nohria, N. (1998) ‘The dynamics of learning alliances: competition, 
cooperation, and relative scope’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp.193–210. 
Kogut, B. (1988) ‘Joint ventures: theoretical and empirical perspectives’, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 9, pp.319–322. 
Koza, M. and Lewin, A. (2000). ‘Managing partnerships and strategic alliances: raising the odds of 
success’, European Management Journal, Vol. 16, pp.146–151. 
Kumar, R.L. and Nti, K. (1998) ‘Differential learning and interaction in alliance dynamics: a 
process and outcome discrepancy model’, Organization Science, Vol. 9, pp.356–367. 
Lane, P. and Lubatkin, M. (1998) ‘Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning’, 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp.461–477. 
Larson, A. (1992) ‘Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: a study of the governance of 
exchange relationships’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 37, pp.76–104. 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1990) ‘A dual methodology for case studies: synergestic use of a longitudinal 
single site with replicated multiple sites’, Organization Science, Vol. 1, pp.248–267. 
Lieberman, M.B. and Montgomery, D.B. (1988) ‘First-mover advantages’, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 9, pp.41–58. 
Lieberman, M.B. and Montgomery, D.B. (1998) ‘First-mover (dis)advantages: retrospective and 
link with the resource-based view’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, p.1111. 
Makadok, R. (1998) ‘Can first-mover and early-mover advantages be sustained in an industry with 
low barriers to entry/imitation?’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp.683–696. 
Mitchell, W. (1991) ‘Dual clocks: entry order influences on incumbent and newcomer market share 
and survival when specialized assets retain their value’, Strategic Management Journal,
Vol. 12, pp.85–100. 
Oliver, C. (1990) ‘Determinants of interorganizational relationships: integration and future 
directions’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 15, pp.241–265. 
Park, S.H. and Ungson, G.R. (2001) ‘Interfirm rivalry and managerial complexity’, Organization 
Science, Vol. 12, pp.37–53. 
Parkhe, A. (1993a) ‘“Messy” research, methodologies predispositions, and theory development in 
international joint ventures’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 18, pp.227–268. 
      
      
   178 V. Mahnke and M.L. Overby    
      
      
      
Parkhe, A. (1993b) ‘Strategic alliance structuring: a game theoretic and transaction cost 
examination of interfirm cooperation’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 36,  
pp.794–829. 
Perlmutter, H. and Heenan, D. (1986) ‘Cooperate to compete globally’, Harvard Business Review,
Vol. 64, pp.136–152. 
Porter, M.E. (Ed.) (1983) The Technological Dimension of Competitive Strategy. Greenwich, CT: 
JAI Press, Inc. 
Powell, W. (Ed.) (1990) Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, Vol. 12, 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Reuer, J. and Koza, M. (2000) ‘Asymmetric information and joint venture performance: theory and 
evidence for domestic and international joint ventures’, Strategic Management Journal,
Vol. 21, pp.81–88. 
Reuer, J., Zollo, M. and Singh, H. (2002) ‘Post-formation dynamics in strategic alliances’, 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23, pp.135–151. 
Ring, P., Doz, Y. and Olk, P. (2005) ‘Managing formation processes in R&D consortia’, California 
Management Review, Vol. 47, pp.137–157. 
Ring, P. and Van de ven, A. (1994) ‘Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational 
relationships’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 19, pp.90–118. 
Robinson, W.T. (1988) ‘Sources of market pioneer advantages: the case of industrial goods 
industries’, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 25, pp.87–94. 
Robinson, W.T. and Fornell, C. (1985) ‘Sources of market pioneer advantages in consumer goods 
industries’, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 22, pp.305–317. 
Sakakibara, M. (1997) ‘Heterogeneity of firm capabilities and cooperative research and 
development: an empirical examination of motives’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18, 
pp.143–164. 
Santos, F. and Eisenhardt, K. (2002) ‘Boundary management and organizational growth’, Paper 
presented at the Academy of Management.
Schmalensee, R. (1982) ‘Product differentiation advantages of pioneering brands’, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 27, pp.349–365. 
Schoenecker, T.S. and Cooper, A.C. (1998) ‘The role of firm resources and organizational 
attributes in determining entry timing: a cross-industry study’, Strategic Management Journal,
Vol. 19, pp.1127–1143. 
Shamsie, J., Phelps, C. and Kuperman, J. (2004) ‘Better late than never: a study of late entrants in 
household electrical equipment’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 25, pp.69–84. 
Song, M., Di Benedetto, A. and Zhao, Y. (1999) ‘Pioneering advantages in manufacturing and 
service industries: empirical evidence from nine countries’, Strategic Management Journal,
Vol. 20, pp.811–836. 
Spekman, R., Forbes, T., Isabella, L. and MacAvoy, T. (1998) ‘Alliance management: a view from 
the past and a look to the future’, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 35, pp.747–772. 
Yan, A. and Gray, B. (1994) ‘Bargaining power, management control, and Performance in United 
States-China joint ventures: a comparative case study’, Academy of Management Journal,
Vol. 37, pp.1478–1517. 
Yin, R.K. (1989) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. London: Sage Publications. 
Zeng, M. and Chen, X-P. (2003) ‘Achieving cooperation in multiparty alliances: a social dilemma 
approach to partnership management’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28, pp.587–605. 
Note 
1UMTS stands for Universal Mobile Telecommunications System. 
